This paper develops a simultaneous-equations panel data econometric model to obtain point estimates of market power and pricing conduct in a representative product-differentiated, oligopolistic food market. The importance of this class of markets is recognized given its prevalence in the food and fiber system, especially for final consumer food products. The $1.3 billion domestic spaghetti sauce industry is featured. Although the results indicate firms exert limited market power, a portion of this power is derived from tacit price collusion. A higher degree of price collusion was found among brands within a market segment than between segments.
In the empirical marketing literature, researchers have relied heavily on the assumption of product homogeneity.
The assumption has been incorporated in both temporal and spatial analyses of market power and firm conduct in output and input markets. Representative papers for various agricultural industries include meat processing (Schroeter; Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson; Azzam and Schroeder) , fruit and vegetable processing (Warm and Sexton) , dairy (Liu, Sun, and Kaiser), general food processing (Holloway) , and tobacco (Appelbaum). There are several explanations for the continued emphasis on homogeneous product Steven Vickner is assistant professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Kentucky. Stephen Davies is professor in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at Colorado State University. The authors thank Dana Hoag, Norman Dalsted, and Harvey Cutler for their comments. models in this realm of research. First, the assumption appears to be consistent with product characteristics in the markets investigated. A second reason stems from theoretical elegance, as these models are more parsimonious and allow for the direct estimation of a market power parameter (Varian). Finally, aggregate commodity data are typically available in secondar y sources.
A broad class of imperfectly competitive markets, product-differentiated oligopolies, has been under-represented in the literature despite its prevalence in the food and fiber system especially for final consumer food products. The Connor et al. study is commonly cited as evidence that diversified food manufacturers depart from marginal cost pricing.
However, many of the SIC codes in that study represent the aggregation of structural oligopolies in which firms sell differentiated products to consumers. For example, SIC code 20860 represents carbonated soft drinks and contains nine brands and numerous associated products in the regular (e.g., non-diet) segment alone (Cotterill) . The aggregation inherent in five-digit SIC codes falsely leaves the impression that the product homogeneity assumption is appropriate for every food market.
Our understanding of empirical market power and firm conduct in differentiated oligopolies is clearly in its infancy. Current analyses lag theoretical developments in this area (Tirole) , and the empirical work is neither as extensive nor refined as homogeneous product industry research. Business strategists and antitrust policymakers would benefit from a broader base of empirical evidence. Thus, the empirical objective of this paper is to measure market power and pricing conduct at the brand level in a representative oligopolistic output market.
The domestic spaghetti sauce industry was chosen as an intriguing and representative processed agricultural product to study for various reasons. The industry is worth $1.3 billion annually and so is an important component of the food and fiber system. It is a structural oligopoly in which products, highly differentiated by brand, flavor, and size, are manufactured and sold. 1 Also, several features of this market may lead to heightened consumer price sensitivity. Spaghetti sauce is a durable good since its shelf life exceeds the time period between price changes (Tirole) . Thus, a product becomes an intertemporal substitute for itself because consumers can stockpile when it is on sale. The products are sold in a common store location because they are substitutes in use, so consumers can make comparisons across products and brands. Another dimension of this industry is the role of transportation costs in pricing decisions. These products are relatively heavy and need to be transported from remote manufacturing locations to spatially dispersed selling markets.
This paper builds on several previous studies addressing this class of markets to enlarge the pool of empirical knowledge. Contribu1Due to data and model size limitations, the analysis is restricted to brand differentiation.
tions are made to the literature in terms of model specification, where we control for merchandising, use a weekly time series, and empirically disentangle pricing conduct associated with rivalrous behavior from pricing conduct related to a firm's shipping costs. More generally, this New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) study departs from the traditional NEIO paradigm as it identifies, in part, the source of market power and tracks a single industry through both time and space (Bresnahan) . Finally, in the process of obtaining feasible error-components three-stage least-squares (EC3SLS) estimators of market power and pricing conduct with methods developed by Kinal and Lahiri, several errors in the econometrics literature were identified and corrected (Vickner and Davies) .
Related Literature
Examples of empirical market power research relaxing the assumption of product homogeneity are relatively sparse. Baker and Bresnahan pioneered the use of residual demand analysis, applying it to the brewing industry. Their study was one of the seminal NEIO papers to model the attributes of a product-differentiated market, where each firm faces its own demand curve rather than an industry demand curve. Moreover, prices in these demand systems are not only endogenous but are also interdependent (Shapiro) . Their practical approach to market delineation had several undesirable features. First, the estimated conduct parameter, the residual demand elasticity, was a composite of the price elasticity of demand and the conjectural variation elasticity, so individual effects could not be identified. Second, as discussed by Froeb and Werden, the ability to quantify the dynamic behavior of both consumers and purveyors is limited by the use of temporally aggregated time series.
Liang investigated the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry using a different model formulation to separately estimate both components of the residual demand elasticity. She used a linear demand system and corresponding set of linear price reaction functions to endogenize prices and quantify pricing conduct (Deaton and Muellbauer) . Consistent with the approach taken by Liang, the first-order conditions of a general price conjectural variations model were to endogenize price and quantify strategic interaction among the firms. Cotterill's study, while a generalization and extension of previous approaches, is not without problems. First, merchandising (e.g., in-store or point-ofpurchase advertising) was not controlled for properly, possibly due to data availability issues. Three mutually exclusive merchandising measures were used to characterize the selling conditions: (a) the product was highlighted in a feature ad or newsprint flier, (b) the product was put on some form of display, and (c) the product was simultaneously placed in a feature ad and on a display. Scanner data suppliers such as Information Resources, Inc. (IRI), A.C. Nielsen, and Efficient Market Services measure both the percent of brand's sales and the percent of all commodity volume (ACV) made on a given merchandising condition. Cotterill used the former. Because the ACV measure quantifies the percent of stores in a geographic market maintaining one of the three merchandising conditions, we consider it a more appropriate demand shift variable.z
Cotterill also treated real expenditure as an exogenous variable in the model when it is clearly a function of the endogenous variables. Finally, data aggregation was an issue in the study. Quarterly time series observations were used because a less aggregate series was not available. However, both consumer and strategic behavior is affected on a weekly basis, as pricing and merchandising activities are managed in that short time frame (Kinsey and Senauer). Because twelve weeks of data were 2Becausestores vary in size, the stores used in the measure are weighted by sales or ACV. averaged into one quarterly observation, the ability to accurately measure consumer behavior, firm conduct, and, hence, market power, was diminished.
Model Development
Departures from the product homogeneity assumption result in several knotty modeling issues. First, industry output Q (e.g.,~!. 1 q, = Q jim jirms i = 1, . . . . n) and an overall industry demand curve do not exist as the output of each firm is measured in incommensurate units. The convenient closed form expressions for market power based on Q are immediately rendered invalid and, instead, each firm faces an individual demand curve for its own product. Demand is then a function of its own price, prices of imperfect substitutes, expenditure, and demand shift variables. Firm level demands must necessarily be obtained in a systems context to be used subsequently in the calculation of market power.
Consistent with the approach taken by Cotterill, the demand-side of the econometric model is based on the LA/AIDS model. Using the AIDS model is appropriate as it utilizes dollar market shares, thus measuring demands in commensurate units across brands. The linear approximation of the AIDS model appears to be reasonable as well in that Stone's linear price index performs well relative to competing price indexes, especially under conditions of price multicollinearity (Alston, Foster, and Green) . The latter issue is important in markets where price collusion or fellowship is present. Since the panel data model in this study is used in part to explain pricing spatially and temporally, Moschini's transformation of the price series is inappropriate.3 The demand system is given by () (1) s,,, =~,+ : %,% p,,, + PJ% $ If wherẽ MOs~hini'stransformation requires each price series to be a price index, thus eliminating the price level across the selling markets.
(2) log P: = g Sk,,log Pkl,
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 1999 Equation (1) represents the share equations for each of the five brands included in the spaghetti sauce market, For example, brand 1's market share (ski,) equation is a function of own price (log p, ,t), competitive prices (log P2tr* . . . * logp,,,), real expenditure (log(xlp~)), and miscellaneous shift variables relevant to brand 1 (~&Dl 5@n~;,), such as own merchandising, competitive merchandising, time trends, seasonality, and holiday effects (e.g., the set D1). Each of the k share equations is stochastic and has two error components. The first is the random unobservable individual effect (q~l) that only varies spatially across markets in the study. The second is the usual stochastic error (u~)) that varies over both time and space. The subscript k and superscript s indicate the error components term for brand k's share equation. Brands k = 1, . . . . 5 represent, respectively, Ragu, Prego, Hunt's, Classico, and Healthy Choice. The cross-sectional unit subscript i runs from selling markets 1 to 10, while the time-series subscript t runs from weeks 1 to 104. Equation (2) is Stone's linear price index. Equations (3) to (5) represent the usual adding-up,4 homogeneity, and symmetry restrictions, respectively. Since the term x in Stone's price index represents expenditure in the spaghetti sauce market, not income, it is treated as endogenous. It is specified in the system as an identity. Thus, real expenditure in the spaghetti sauce market is 4In our model, the expenditure shares do not sum exactly to one as the i3~parameters are not restricted to sum to zero, hence preventing the covariance matrix from becoming singular. The usual remedy of dropping a share equation in the estimation to ensure the addingup Property holds is not possible here as it would not preserve the entire specification of endogenizing the shares and prices. We are unaware of a fully consistent procedure to achieve this. endogenous and is replaced by an instrument in the estimation.
The second problem associated with relaxing the assumption of product homogeneity is that prices in the demand system are not only endogenous to the system, but are also interdependent given the strategic interaction among purveyors in the industry. Following Liang and Cotterill, consistent parameter estimates are recovered through the construction of a price reaction function for each price present in the demand system. These are given by 
,eRL
For example, brand 1's price (log p,,,) is a function of competitive prices (log pz,,, . . . . log p~,,), observable transportation costs (log c1,), and miscellaneous shift variables relevant to brand 1 (2,,., 8,, v,,,), such as time trends, seasonality, and holiday effects (e.g., the set RI). Because data for firm-specific manufacturing costs are not available, the intercept p,ĩ s used to capture its effect. Each price reaction function has two error components similar to the demand system equations, where the subscript k and superscript p indicate that these are error components for brand k's price reaction equation. Unlike the Liang and Cotterill models, this specification of the price reaction function disentangles pricing conduct associated with rivalrous behavior of competing firms from pricing conduct related to each firm's shipping costs. Factors influencing the former are captured by the term~1~~$~1 log pli, where the sum captures all rivals' pricing conduct. The price reaction elasticities, +~1,quantify the percentage change in brand k's price given a 1YO increase in brand 1's price. A positive price reaction elasticity implies tacit price collusion and an upward sloping price reaction function. The latter is a necessary condition for a Nash equilibria in a static game of differentiated Bertrand competition (Shapiro) .
The transportation cost term log c~, is the product of the time invariant shipping distance 
Empirical Results
Given the characteristics of the model presented in equations (1) to (6) and the need to generalize the results to other selling markets not present in the study, an EC3SLS estimator was chosen (Comwell, Schmidt, and Wyhowski) . With respect to the latter rationale, the 10 markets represent a sample of selling markets so an error-components model is required to make inferences about the population. The results from the EC3SLS estimator are also compared to a one-way fixed-effects three-stage least-squares (FE3SLS) estimator. The system is identified with respect to order and rank conditions (Bhargava) .G The matrix of instruments was constructed according to Hausman and Taylor and maintains Baltagi's erogeneity properties; parameter estimates were obtained using generalized least-squares (Kinal and Lahiri). In the process of obtaining feasible EC3SLS estimators of market power and pricing conduct with computational methods developed by Kinal and Lahiri, several errors in the econometrics literature were identified and corrected (Vickner and Davies) . The system weighted R2 value for the FE3SLS 5This result is not unexpected. The firm are astute marketers and have designed marketing plans with these demographic factors in mind. In the currentmodel specification, the between version of the firms' marketing control variables captures the demographic effects sufficiently across selling markets, removing their explanatory power (Cornwell, Schmidt, and WyhowSki) .
c In the EC3SLS model, the instrumentset contains 15 merchandising variables, a linear time trend, and five transportation cost series. In the FE3SLS model, the instrument set contains the 15 merchandising variables, a linear time trend, and the fixed effects. 
Price Elasticities
For the class of markets under investigation, calculations used to obtain measures of market power and pricing conduct require demand elasticities for each brand. Table 2 summarizes the point estimates of the uncompensated own-price and cross-price elasticities for the five estimated demand equations. The price elasticities for the LA/AIDS model are calculated using average shares (sJ and, for each demand equation, are read from left to right in the table. The uncompensated elasticity formula employs Chalfant's assumption (e.g., d log P*/il log pl = SI) and is given by e~l =
-Ak[ + l/s~(y~{ -~Nl). The Kronecker delta
A~l equals one for k = 1 and zero otherwise. Alston, Foster, and Green found this elasticity measure to perform well relative to alternatives in Monte Carlo experiments. The own-price elasticities are found along the diagonal in both sections of Table 2 . They are statistically significant (p < 0.01) and negative and, not surprisingly, the demand for each brand is elastic. For example, in the case of the FE3SLS estimator, a 1?toincrease in the price of Ragu leads to a 3.84$Z0decrease in the quantity sold of Ragu. There are several explanations for the elastic demands. As noted above, a jar of spaghetti sauce is a durable good because its storable life exceeds the time between price changes, which implies that each product is an intertemporal substitute for itself (Tirole) . Hence, consumers can stockpile sauce when it is on sale and avoid purchases at the regular price. The end result is a heightened state of consumer price sensitivity. This finding is entirely consistent with marketing research literature examining the adverse effects of frequent price discounting (Papatla and Krishnamurthi).
Another explanation for the magnitude of own-price elasticities stems from the disaggregate data used in this study. Many empirical demand studies for food use yearly, quarterly, or monthly data for broad groups of related products. Because of the long-run nature of the data and the masking effect induced by brand and market aggregation, own-price elasticities obtained in these studies are usually found to be inelastic. In the present study, Note: *** 1% significance level; ** 5q0 significance; * 1O% significance level.
weekly brand-level scanner data was used to measure the consumer response to price changes in a narrowly defined market. Results of other studies based on this micro-level data corroborate this finding (Guadagni and Little; Capps and Nayga; Cotterill; Seo and Capps) . For example, despite being biased and inconsistent, the average uncompensated own-price elasticities of demand in the Seo and Capps study are similar to those in Table 2 for Prego, Ragu, Classico, and Hunt's sauces for the 10 IRI markets used in this study.' The cross-price elasticities are found off the diagonal in both sections of Table 2 . For the FE3SLS estimator, all cross-price elasticities are statistically significant (p < 0.01) and, consistent with a-prior expectations, positive. Thus, the brands represent economic substitutes and constitute a well-defined, relevant product market. For example, a 1% increase in the price of Prego leads to a 1.3590 increasẽ The Seo and Capps study actually used store-level data for a sample of 1,500 spatially dispersed stores. The authors then aggregated the data by store into 40 "markets." These data should not be confused with the standard IRI Infoscan market-level data used in our study. This data includes not only the 1,500 stores, but also the other stores scanned in each market (e.g., it includes the entire population of scanned stores in each market). Hence, the IRI market-level data is more comprehensive and appropriate for the empirical objective of this paper (Cotterill) .
in the quantity sold of Ragu. In the case of the EC3SLS estimator, all but five of 20 crossprice elasticities are statistically significant (p < ().()1) and positive. There are two negative cross-price elasticities, albeit at marginal levels of statistical significance, and three positive but statistically insignificant cross-price elasticities. The common store location of this market facilitates price comparisons and logically leads to the general finding of economic substitutes. For similar studies reporting crossprice elasticities, the products were generally found to be economic substitutes (Cotterill; Seo and Capps) .
Price Reaction Elasticities
The calculations used to obtain measures of market power and pricing conduct also require information regarding a firm's price reaction, or response, to rivals' pricing decisions. Table  3 summarizes this information regarding the strategic interaction among the firms. Read from left to right, the table presents the point estimates of the price reaction elasticities for each of the five price reaction equations in the econometric system. Given the double log specification, the price-reaction elasticities, or {f, are given by the estimated +~, parameters from equation (6).
The empirical results are consistent with Table 2 . b Observed elasticity is given by 61 =~kk + Z,Ak~k,eff, where efl are the price reaction elasticities from Table 3 . ' Fully collusive elasticity is gwen by tzf = Z, ek,, theory, as the estimated price reaction functions are generally upward-sloping (Shapiro) . For example, under the FE3SLS estimator, the Ragu price reaction function (in the row labeled Ragu) shows that a 1!ZOincrease in the price of Prego results in a 0.47% increase in the price of Ragu. Nineteen of the 20 price reaction elasticities for the FE3SLS estimator are statistically significant (p < 0. 10) and, consistent with a-priori expectations, positive. Only one price reaction elasticity is positive and statistically insignificant. Sixteen of the 20 price reaction elasticities for the EC3SLS estimator are statistically significant (p <0. 10) and positive. Three price reaction elasticities are positive and statistically insignificant. In the Ragu price reaction function, the elasticity for the price of Hunt's sauce is negative and marginally significant (p <0. 10).
Cotterill found similar results in the direction, magnitude, and statistical significance for leading brands in the carbonated soft drink industry (e.g., the Pepsi price reaction elasticity in the Coke empirical price reaction function was 0.51, while the Coke price reaction elasticity in the Pepsi empirical price reaction function was 0.56). Both estimates were statistically significant (p < 0.01). Consistent with Liang, price coordination appears to be more common within a market segment than between segments. For example, in the EC3SLS model, the respective pairs of price reaction elasticities are greater in magnitude for Ragu and Prego (within the traditional segment) than for either Hunt's and Prego (between the canned and traditional segments) or Healthy Choice and Classico (between the health-conscious and premium segments).
Measures of Market Power and Pricing Conduct
Combining the results from Tables 2 and 3 yields the various measures of market power and pricing conduct that address the empirical objective of this paper. Table 4 summarizes these point estimates. The market power formulas are restated in the footnotes to the table for convenience. The second column in Table  4 contains the non-fellowship elasticities (US DOJ and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines). These are simply the uncompensated ownprice elasticities from Table 2 . As the name implies, this elasticity measures the sensitivity in quantity sold that a firm faces when it raises price but no rivals follow. For this reason, the The third column in Table 4 contains the observed elasticities. These are derived following Baker and Bresnahan and are given by Eg =~~~+~1~~~~1ey. Following Cotterill, the elasticities of demand (e.g., •~~and e~l) are taken from Table 2 and the empirical price reaction elasticities (e.g., eg)x are taken from Table 3. In the presence of imperfect tacit price collusion (e.g., O < qfl < 1), the observed elasticities will be smaller in absolute value than the non-fellowship elasticities. In some cases, the observed elasticities are a full percentage point lower in absolute value than the non-fellowship elasticities. This is further evidence of tacit price collusion in the spaghetti sauce market and the pattern persists across both estimators. Based on the observed elasticities, Ragu and Prego again, in a relative sense, maintain the greatest degree of market power. As was the case for the non-fellowship elasticities, in an absolute sense, none of the brands maintain much market power based on the observed elasticities. The average observed elasticity in the Cotterill study of -1.45 is much less elastic than those obtained for the brands in this study.
The fourth column in Table 4 contains the fully collusive elasticities. These are given by q =~1 6,,. In the presence of imperfect tacit price collusion, the fully collusive elasticities will be smaller in absolute value than the ob- served elasticities.g With the exception of Hunt's and Classico in the EC3SLS model, the fully collusive elasticities are within one-fifth of a percentage point of being unitary elastic. 10 Thus, the brands in the market acting in concert have the potential to substantially reduce the elasticity of their own respective demand curves. In this scenario, each firm in the market exercises a high degree of absolute market power. The average fully collusive elasticity in the Cotterill study of -0.94 is fairly close to those obtained for the brands in this study. The fifth and sixth columns in Table 4 contain two indexes of market power. The Rothschild index (RZ) measures the existence of market power as the ratio of the fully collusive elasticity to the non-fellowship elasticity (Greer) . Under perfect competition, the latter elasticity converges to negative infinity, driving the ratio to zero. Under monopoly, the two elasticities coincide, resulting in an index value of one. The closer the index is to one the greater the degree of market power, and it is bounded as O s Rl 5 1.
The O index (01), introduced by Cotterill, also measures the existence of market power. The OZ is given by the ratio of the fully collusive elasticity. Similar to the RZ, it is bounded as O 5 OZ < 1. Again, the closer the index is to one the greater the degree of market power. The relationship between the two indexes is O s RZ s OZ = 1. In a relative sense, Ragu and Prego tend to exercise more market power than the other brands. One exception to this is Hunt's in the EC3SLS model. In an absolute sense, comparing each index value to its maximum possible value of unity shows that no firm in the market exercises much market power. Additionally, the average RZ and OZ values in the Cotterill study of 0.67 and 0.72, respectively, exceed those obtained for the brands in this study. Again, this indicates less gThe relationshipsamong the three elasticitiesin Table 4 (e.g.,~~= O Vk), the fully collusive elasticities would be exactly equal to unity with homogeneity imposed on the model. market power exists in the spaghetti sauce market than in the carbonated soft drink market.
The last column in Table 4 contains the values of the Chamberlain quotient (CQ). The CQ, introduced by Cotterill, is given by one less the ratio of the observed elasticity to the non-fellowship elasticity. Thus, it quantifies the fraction of market power, as measured by the observed elasticity, derived from tacit price collusion. It is bounded as O s CQ 5 1, where higher CQ values indicate higher levels of tacit price collusion. Under both estimators the pattern of results is similar. Ragu and Prego each derive roughly 30% of their market power from tacit price collusion. Classico and Healthy Choice derive less market power from tacit price collusion than the two leading brands, while Hunt's derives the least. Juxtaposing this result with those based on the RI and 01, Hunt's appears to possess market power due to its positioning in a niche segment, not collusion. This result is consistent with the brewing industry (Baker and Bresnahan) , where the three largest players were found to exercise market power in the absence of price collusion. Finally, the average CQ value for the two leading brands in the Cotterill study (e.g., Coke and Pepsi) of 0.15 is less than most of those obtained for the brands in this study, indicating more tacit price collusion exists in the spaghetti sauce market than in the regular carbonated soft drink market.
Transportation Costs
In the FE3SLS model, the Xk parameters are not estimable as the transportation costs, or log c~i variables, do not vary by week and, hence, are correlated with the fixed-effects for the markets. Given the generality of the EC3SLS framework (Cornwell, Schmidt, and Wyhowski), it was possible to include timeinvariant effects in the design matrix of the model. Consequently, transportation costs were built into each price reaction function to empirically separate their effect on a firm's price from that of rivalrous pricing conduct. Table 5 summarizes the point estimates of the transportation cost elasticities for the five brands represented in the econometric system. The first version of the EC3SLS model assumes transportation costs are defined to be the product of shipping distance and 'fuel price, while the second version of the EC3SLS model uses shipping distance only. The results for both versions of the EC3SLS model are similar. The Ragu transportation cost elasticity across both models is statistically significant (p < 0.01) and positive. Thus, a 19Z0 increase in the transportation cost leads to a 0.0290 increase in the price of Ragu. The elasticity for Classico is also positive for both models, but is statistically significant (p < 0. 10) in the second version only. The positive coefficient is evidence that the firms may be practicing basing-point pricing (Greenhut, Norman, and Hung) . Across both models, the 
